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Chapter I Anticorruption strategies in public organizations 
 
Corruption, through extended and diversified forms of expression has become an object of 
study and analysis, both for experts, analysts and public authorities and institutions. The 
latter, concerned by the effects of corruption on the social and economic development have 
aimed and achieved a series of anticorruption strategies, focused on combating and 
eliminating the causes of corruption, thus also their consequences. For the public 
organizations, found frequently in public administrations and generally in the public sector, 
theories have been formulated aimed at minimization of the corruption phenomena. 
 
I.1 Fundamental issues of anticorruption strategies 
 
The governance processes and corruption phenomena are in a direct connection and benefit 
of profound analyses. Dealing corruption from the economic, cultural or political 
perspective, Rose-Ackerman (2005) reveals four dimensions1: 
? The first one is carried out on the background of public organisations, state and 
society, where corruption could create inefficiency and inequity. The purpose of 
reforms is not to eliminate corruption but to improve state efficiency, fairness and 
legitimacy. In this context, it is worth to mention a fundamental idea for the anti 
corruption strategies: “the total elimination of corruption will never be worthwhile, 
but steps can be taken to limit its reach and reduce the harms it causes” 
? Corruption has different meanings in different societies. It is difficult to establish a 
clear border between legal and illegal, between merit and bribe. 
? How the basic structures of the public and private sector can produce or repress 
corruption. The prospect of a reform will change both the constitutional structures 
and the fundamental relation between market and state. 
? Difficulty of reform for public or governmental organisations and the role of the 
international community in reform. The internal reform policy is essential, and 
between various organisations valuable lessons can be transferred even if the 
conditions are not always similar. 
Although the author asserts: “this book does not present a blueprint for reform”, she 
suggests “a range of alternatives that reforms must tailor to the conditions in individual 
countries”. However “reform should not be limited to the creation of integrity systems” 
and “the primary goal should be to reduce the underlying incentives to pay and receive 
bribes, not to tighten systems of ex post control”. 
Previously to Rose-Ackerman’s assertions, Banfield (1975) analyses the key features 
that a public organization should meet in order to minimize corruption2. Briefly, they 
are: 
? the executive agents are selected on the basis of probity and institutional 
loyalty; 
? there is a complete set of positive motivations for the loyal public service 
(including a high salary); 
? there is a complete set of negative motivations, applied compulsory when 
corrupt acts were already identified; 
                                                 
1 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005) “Corruption and Government Causes, Consequences and Reform”, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 4-5 
2 Banfield, E., C., (1975), “Corruption as a feature of governmental organization”, The Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol XVIII (3), December, p. 593. Undertaken from Prohnitchi, V., (2003), “Contextul economic 
si institutional al coruptiei”, Editura TISH, Chisinau, pp 45-65 
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? the goals and missions for a job are formulated clearly and univoque by 
director; 
? the agents hold the necessary discretion for executing the job tasks; 
? no ambiguities in rules; 
? the director monitors the agent’s performance; 
? if there is the smallest doubt about the agent’s probity, he/she is dismissed. 
? the director, on his/her turn is also monitored. 
 
The preoccupations of international organisations may be added to the above contributions, 
substantiating anticorruption strategies at the level of government or sectoral public 
organisations. In this respect, the World Bank has asserted as an important and competent 
actor in the analysis concerning the causes and consequences of corruption. The control of 
corruption has become a core indicator of governance and the strategies grounded on this 
indicator represent pillars for national authorities. 
The World Bank promotes good governance and anticorruption actions as important pillars 
for reducing the poverty. The World Bank sustains the national or regional efforts for 
public integrity, minimization of corruption, as well as awarding assistance to countries in 
view of governance improvement and control of corruption, by means of the World Bank 
Institute (WBI). 
The preoccupations about designing and promoting anticorruption policies as well as 
evaluating the causes/consequences of the corruption phenomenon are also present in the 
European Union, OECD or other transnational bodies such as International Monetary 
Fund, USAID, Transparency International, Heritage Foundation etc. 
 
I.1.1 “State capture” vs. “administrative corruption” 
 
The relation between “state capture” and “administrative corruption”, in better words, its 
intensity, represents the basis of the conception for many anticorruption strategies. 
Defined by Joel and Kaufmann (2001)3, with reverberations especially in transition 
economies, state capture refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the 
public and private sectors to influence making of laws, regulations, decrees, and other 
government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent 
provision of private benefits to public officials.  
Types of institutions subject to capture: 
? the legislature,  
? the executive,  
? the judiciary, or  
? regulatory agencies. 
Types of actors engaged in the capturing: 
? private firms,  
? political leaders, or  
? narrow interest groups.  
Yet all forms of state capture are directed toward extracting rents from the state for a 
narrow range of individuals, firms, or sectors through distorting the basic legal and 
regulatory framework with potentially enormous losses for the society at large. They thrive 
where economic power is highly concentrated, countervailing social interests are weak, 
                                                 
3 Joel, H., Kaufmann, D., (2001), “Confronting the challenge of state capture in transition economies”, 
Finance and Development, Vol. 38, No. 3, Sept., IMF 
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and the formal channels of political influence and interest intermediation are 
underdeveloped. 
On the other hand, administrative corruption refers to the intentional imposition of 
distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to 
provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-
transparent provision of private gains to public officials. Examples of administrative 
corruption: bribes to a seemingly endless stream of official inspectors to overlook minor 
(or possibly major) infractions of existing regulations; “grease payments” as bribes to gain 
licenses, to smooth customs procedures, to win public procurement contracts, or to be 
given priority in the provision of a variety of other government services; state officials can 
simply misdirect public funds under their control for their own or their family’s direct 
financial benefit. At the root of this form of corruption is discretion on the part of public 
officials to grant selective exemptions, to prioritize the delivery of public services, or to 
discriminate in the application of rules and regulations. (Figure I.1) 
 
Figure I.1 Multi -pronged Strategy: Addressing State Capture and Administrative  
                 Corruption4
 
 
 
To be effective, a multi-pronged approach requires some guidelines for the selection and 
sequencing of reform priorities tailored to the particular contours of the corruption problem 
in each country.  
The typology can be divided into four spheres determined by the relative levels of state 
capture and administrative corruption: 
                                                 
4 The World Bank, (2000), “Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate”, chapter 4, p. 
39, Washington D.C. 
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• Countries within the medium-medium category have been able to contain both types of 
corruption to more manageable levels, though serious challenges remain. 
• In the medium-high category are countries where the problem of administrative 
corruption remains the central problem, while the state has been less subject to capture by 
the private sector than other transition countries. 
• The high-medium category includes countries that have been able to contain the level of 
administrative corruption relative to other transition countries, but nevertheless have done 
so in a context of high state capture. 
• In the high-high category, a serious problem of administrative corruption—and hence, 
weak state capacity—is nested in a state highly subject to capture. 
 
I.2 World Bank: Designing Effective Anticorruption Strategies5
 
The strategies are based on the studies and field analyses carried out even by the World 
Bank or prestigious authors for the topic on combating corruption. The actual strategy 
offers “a framework for self-assessment of corruption within each country rather than a 
device for providing a fixed reform blueprint for each country in the region”. At the same 
time, “a key argument embedded in the typology is that an anticorruption strategy should 
be designed not only in response to the level of either state capture or administrative 
corruption alone in a given country, but to the interaction of these forms of corruption as 
well”6.    
In the context of the above documentary sources, Figure I.2 presents a synthesis of the key 
focus, challenges and priorities for each typology of the relation state capture-
administrative corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The World Bank, (2000), “Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate”, chapter 5, 
pp. 58-78, Washington D.C. 
6 Idem, p.59 
Figure I.2 Intensity of the relation state capture-administrative corruption and structure of anticorruption strategies 
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I.3 On fighting corruption in the European Union 
 
As a safeguard instrument for ensuring a common area of freedom, security and justice, 
fighting corruption was seen among the priorities of the European Union, as early as the 
Treaty on European Union:   
 
“[…] the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of 
freedom, security and justice by […] preventing and combating crime, organized or otherwise, in 
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and 
illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud, through:  
- closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities 
in the Member States, both directly and through the European Police Office (Europol), in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 30 and 32; 
- closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States 
including cooperation through the European Judicial Cooperation Unit ("Eurojust"), in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32; 
- approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e)”7. 
 
Since, the European institutions regularly underlined the necessity for developing and 
enhancing prevention measures against corruption phenomenon. The Action plan to 
combat organized crime (1997) 8 offers in this regard an overall picture of the European 
Union’s concrete plans and measures for fighting corruption. According to it for instance, 
the Member States, the Council and the Commission, should develop: 
 
“[…]a comprehensive policy to tackle corruption, including appropriate and efficient sanctions, 
but also tackling all aspects linked with the proper functioning of the internal market and other 
internal policies, as well as external assistance and cooperation (political guideline 13). […]This 
policy should primarily focus on elements of prevention, addressing such issues as the impact of 
defective legislation, public-private relationships, transparency of financial management, rules on 
participation in public procurement, and criteria for appointments to positions of public 
responsibility, etc. It should also cover the area of sanctions, be they of a penal, administrative or 
civil character, as well as the impact of the Union's policy on relations with third States.” 
 
In 2000 in fact, “The prevention and control of organized crime: A European Union 
Strategy for the beginning of the new millennium”9 became a reality. It was there that the 
European Communities reiterated the need for instruments aimed at the approximation of 
national legislation and developing a more general (multi-disciplinary) EU policy 
towards corruption, taking into account as appropriate work being carried out in 
international organizations. Furthermore, the same document urged those Member States, 
which had not yet ratified the relevant EU and Council of Europe anti-corruption legal 
instruments to ensure speedy ratification within a clear timeframe. 
Finally, in 2003, the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European and Social Committee on a Comprehensive EU policy 
against corruption  (2003)10 reaffirmed that tackling corruption and fraud within the EU 
                                                 
7 Article 29, Consolidated version, Official Journal C 325, 24 December 2002. 
8 Official Journal C 251, 15 August 1997. 
9 Official Journal C124, 3 May 2000.   
10 COM (2003) 317 final, 28 May 2003. 
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institutions and bodies had became an absolute priority for the EU in the last years. In 
addition, it stated that: 
 
“The crisis triggered by the Commission’s resignation in March 1999 revealed the necessity to set 
up more effective measures for the protection of the integrity of the European Public 
Administration. In order to improve the legal framework in that field, the Commission had defined 
various initiatives in its overall strategy for the protection of the Community financial interests of 
2000, its action plan 2001-2003, and more recently, its evaluation report on the OLAF activities” 
(chapter 5, p.13). 
 
Among the actions to develop in order to better fight against corruption, the above 
Communication enumerated, inter alia: raising integrity in the public and private sectors, 
amending national legislation in order to exclude any tax deductibility of bribes, ensuring 
transparency and non-discriminatory access to procurement opportunities, organizing 
bodies of special nature in-between the public and the private sector for fighting 
corruption, encouraging anti-corruption policies in the acceding, candidate and other third 
countries on the basis of ten general principles.  
 
1.To ensure credibility, a clear stance against corruption is essential from leaders and decision-
makers. Bearing in mind that no universally applicable recipes exist, national anti-corruption 
strategies or programmes, covering both preventive and repressive measures, should be drawn up 
and implemented. These strategies should be subject to broad consultation at all levels. 
 
2.Current and future EU Members shall fully align with the EU acquis and ratify and implement 
all main international anti-corruption instruments they are party to (UN, Council of Europe and 
OECD Conventions). Third countries should sign and ratify as well as implement relevant 
international anti-corruption instruments.  
 
3 Anti-corruption laws are important, but more important is their implementation by competent 
and visible anti-corruption bodies (i.e. well trained and specialised services such as anti-corruption 
prosecutors). Targeted investigative techniques, statistics and indicators should be developed. The 
role of law enforcement bodies should be strengthened concerning not only corruption but also 
fraud, tax offences and money laundering. 
 
4 Access to public office must be open to every citizen. Recruitment and promotion should be 
regulated by objective and merit-based criteria. Salaries and social rights must be adequate. Civil 
servants should be required to disclose their assets. Sensitive posts should be subject to rotation. 
 
5 Integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration (judiciary, police, customs, 
tax administration, health sector, public procurement) should be raised through employing quality 
management tools and auditing and monitoring standards, such as the Common Assessment 
Framework of EU Heads of Public Administrations and the Strasbourg Resolution. Increased 
transparency is important in view of developing confidence between the citizens and public 
administration. 
 
6 Codes of conduct in the public sector should be established and monitored. 
 
7 Clear rules should be established in both the public and private sector on whistle blowing (given 
that corruption is an offence without direct victims who could witness and report it) and reporting. 
 
8 Public intolerance of corruption should be increased, through awareness-raising campaigns in 
the media and training. The central message must be that corruption is not a tolerable 
phenomenon, but a criminal offence. Civil society has an important role to play in preventing and 
fighting the problem. 
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9 Clear and transparent rules on party financing, and external financial control of political parties, 
should be introduced to avoid covert links between politicians and (illicit) business interests. 
Political parties evidently have strong influence on decision-makers, but are often immune to anti-
bribery laws. 
 
10 Incentives should be developed for the private sector to refrain from corrupt practices such as 
codes of conduct or “white lists” for integer companies. 
 
I. 4 OECD - Policy Paper and Principles on Anticorruption 
 
In 2007, continuing and enhancing its efforts in the fight against corruption, OECD 
designed and formulated a “programme of collective action”, comprising the directions 
and principles in the fight against corruption11. 
This publication, which is based on proposals and broad guiding principles approved by 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), comprises a DAC Policy Paper on Anti-
Corruption: “Setting an Agenda for Collective Action“ and the DAC Principles for 
Donor Action in Anti-Corruption. It argues that political leadership and enhanced 
accountability can accelerate collective efforts in fighting corruption through better 
governance. It highlights a number of frontiers for collective action where coordinated 
political leadership is needed if the multiple risks associated with corruption are to be 
successfully managed. 
 
I.4.1 Actions proposed by the DAC12
To promote a concerted approach to anti-corruption work at country level … 
• Facilitate joint assessments of corruption and the wider governance context in high-risk 
countries in close cooperation with other organisations, beginning with pilot exercises in 
selected countries which build on any existing work. 
• Signal its support for anticorruption benchmarks and targets that can be agreed jointly 
by donors and partners at country level and used to monitor progress. 
• Endorse as good practice the close coordination of donor governance and anti-
corruption work at country level. 
• Develop a set of good-practice principles (a “voluntary code of conduct’’), to be 
endorsed by ministers and rolled out at country level, on coordinated donor responses to 
deteriorating corruption contexts. 
To tackle the global incentive environment for corruption … 
• Encourage its members to advocate more concerted and systematic action within their 
own governments to implement and enforce international conventions to tackle the 
supply side of corruption (e.g. the offering of bribes by the private sector). 
• Support UN-led processes and efforts to encourage members to ratify and implement 
UNCAC while also encouraging DAC members to combine and integrate their joint anti-
corruption initiatives with other ongoing efforts to implement and monitor UNCAC on 
the ground. 
                                                 
11 OECD, (2007), “Policy Paper and Principles on Anticorruption. Setting an Agenda for Collective 
Action”, OECD Publishing, Paris 
12 Idem, pp. 12-15 
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• Emphasise the interest to the donor community of proposals at the UNCAC Conference 
of the States Parties in December 2006 for information-gathering with respect to 
compliance and related needs for technical assistance. 
• Support international initiatives such as the proposed Global Integrity Alliance as a 
positive way forward in transforming the international incentive environment for integrity 
and good governance. 
 
I.4.2 The Principles for Donor Actions in Anticorruption13
 
The Principles reflected best practice and that their widespread application would 
enhance donor effectiveness in combating corruption. The Principles were given final 
endorsement by the DAC at their 22 September 2006 meeting. 
The Principles embrace the key areas and activities where donors should work together 
on anticorruption. They emphasize the need to support and strengthen the capacity of 
civil society, and underline the need for OECD donors to undertake work in their own 
countries on areas such as repatriation of assets, money laundering, and the ratification 
and implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003). 
The Principles are: 
1. Collectively foster, follow and fit into the local vision 
At the country level, donors should: 
Collectively: 
• Promote with government the development of a shared government-donor 
vision/strategy and collaborative mechanism(s) for anticorruption dialogue and action, 
ideally based on government commitment to implement the UNCAC (or other relevant 
instrument). 
• Share diagnostics, knowledge and analysis through such mechanism(s), identifying gaps 
and reviewing progress. 
• Engage with other key actors through such mechanism(s) (e.g. civil society, media and 
the private sector). 
• Support and strengthen the capacity of civil society for strengthening the demand for 
reform, and promoting and monitoring transparency and accountability in the fight 
against corruption. 
• Work, where government commitment is weak, with local and international civil 
society and private sector actors as the primary alternative, but recognizing that 
strengthening government commitment is the essential objective in the long term. 
• Take time to understand local political, economic, social and historical contexts and 
challenges, and develop responses that are appropriate to them. 
• Favour long-term responses over short-term, reaction-driven inputs, but without losing 
the capacity for responding quickly to support new initiatives and emerging reformers 
where these opportunities arise. 
As individual donors: 
Agree to present anticorruption assistance explicitly as being contributions to the shared 
vision/strategy and the collective donor approach. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Idem, pp. 41-47 
 11
2. Acknowledge and respond to the supply side of corruption 
Development agencies should: 
• Foster stronger action by relevant domestic departments in their own countries against 
the supply-side of corruption in areas such as bribery by donor country companies, 
money laundering, repatriation of assets or the ratification and implementation of major 
international conventions such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
• Inform counterparts in other development agencies of this engagement. 
• Engage proactively with the private sector in partner countries. 
• Ensure that accountability and transparency measures are included in all areas of donor 
assistance. 
• Contribute to strengthening inter-country cooperation (mutual legal assistance, 
mechanisms for asset recovery) both by strengthening capacity in developing countries 
for making requests for international legal cooperation and by collaborating with 
domestic departments where appropriate. 
3.  Marshal knowledge and lessons systematically and measure progress 
At country level, donors should: 
• Collectively foster knowledge gathering to inform policy and operational action, 
drawing, wherever possible, on local capacity. 
• Encourage government to develop systems that better connect evidence with policy 
development. 
• Foster the systemization and publication by government of the measurement and the 
reporting of progress on anti-corruption efforts. 
At the global level, donors should: 
• Develop a systematic approach to dividing up efforts for undertaking strategic 
research/knowledge gathering and synthesis and in sharing results. 
 
I.5 Anticorruption strategies in Romania 
 
Romania’s preoccupations to become a European, democratic state, with an efficient 
administration are reflected especially in the last decade in “the impressive arsenal of 
legal instruments for transparency, responsibility and anticorruption14, aiming to develop 
standards and best practices at the level of administration and other key sectors, such as 
the sanitary system, bodies to maintain public order, justice and strengthening  internal 
and international cooperation in the field of preventing and fight against corruption, 
representing the three priority areas of the National Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007 
(Table I.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Freedom House Washington Inc. (2005), Independent audit of National Anticorruption Strategy 2001-
2004. 
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Table I.1.   Priority areas and objectives of the National Anticorruption Strategy 2005- 200715
 
Priority area Objectives  
Objective 1 Increasing the transparency and  
integrity in public administration 
Objective 2 Preventing corruption in the 
business environment 
Priority area I 
 
PREVENTION, TRANSPARENCY, 
EDUCATION 
Objective 3  Information campaigns and 
educational measures 
Objective 4 Increasing the integrity and 
resistance to corruption of the judiciary system 
Objective 5 Reducing the number of structures 
that have tasks in the fight against corruption  
Objective 6 Strengthening the institutional 
capacity of the National Anticorruption 
Prosecutors Office (NAPO) 
Objective 7 Increasing the celerity of criminal 
prosecution and criminal trials 
Priority area II 
 
COMBATING CORRUPTION 
 
 
Objective 8 Combating corruption through 
administrative means  
Objective 9 Coordinating and monitoring the  
implementation of Strategy and Action Plan 
Priority area III 
 
INTERNAL COOPERATION AND  
COORDINATION 
Objective 10 Fully implementing all the 
anticorruption instruments of UE, UN, CoE 
and OECD 
 
      The mission of the Strategy 2005-2007 is to prevent and counter corruption by 
refining and rigorously implementing the legal framework, through legislative coherence 
and stability, and by institutional strengthening of the entities with important tasks in the 
field. 
    The National Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007 of the Government of Romania has a  
complex structure, with an integrated approach and the public policies on 
anticorruption16 have been elaborated taking into consideration GRECO 
recommendations (in view  to improve the compliance level according to the provisions 
subjected to examinations) and Anticorruption Manual, drawn up by United Nations in 
2003. 
      The actions sustaining the achievement of the 10 objectives of the strategy  (Table 
I.1) are respecting the principles: rule of law, good governance, responsibility, prevention 
of corruption acts, efficiency in countering corruption, cooperation and  coherence, 
transparency, consultation of the civil society and social dialogue, public-private 
partnerships.  
                                                 
15 Decision of the Government of Romania no. 231 on 30 March 2005 concerning the approval of the 
National Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007 and the Action Plan for implementing the National 
Anticorruption Strategy 2005-2007, Official Journal no. 272 on 1 April 2005. 
16 Governing Programme 2005-2008, Chapter 10- Anticorruption Policies, http://www.gov.ro.   
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The analyses and monitoring actions of the European Commission17, Transparency 
International, the reports of GRECO-Council of Europe comprise recommendations 
concerning the elaboration of a coherent anticorruption strategy at national level, which 
should aim the most vulnerable sectors and local government as well as monitoring its 
implementation.  
 Thus, a new strategy is adopted in the National Strategy on preventing and combating 
corruption in vulnerable sectors and local government (2008-2010). This strategy aims to 
design and implement new measures for combating or reducing corruption in vulnerable 
sectors and local government, based on the internal and external assessments of the 
previous strategy during the period of its application, as well as to continue the efforts in 
fighting against corruption. In order to sustain the areas and objectives of the new 
strategy (Table I.2)  four conditional elements (benchmarks - BM) were identified by the 
European Commission and they were comprised in the Commission Decision no. 
2006/928/EC on 13 December 200618; we remark the conditional element number  4, 
referring to „Adoption of additional measures for preventing and fighting against 
corruption, especially in local government”.  
Taking into account the schedule, the strategy will cover the period 2008-2010.  
The representatives of central government, the representatives of association structures of 
local governments have been the actors who elaborated the strategy. 
In view of implementing the strategy, the measures adopted at administration level aimed 
mainly legislative harmonisation and coordination of the legal framework in the field-
most measures in the Action Plan were legislative ones. For example, in the sanitary 
system, the most important normative acts regulating the specific medical activities are 
as follows:  
Law no. 95/2006 on the reform in the field of health (collection of laws for reform in 
health);  
Government Decision no. 862 / 2006, on organisation of the Ministry of Public Health;  
Government Decision no 1842/2006 (for approving the Framework Contract on the 
conditions for medical assistance inside the social security system for health for 2007);  
Order No. 840/2003, on the Methodological Rules for internal public audit in the 
Ministry of Health;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 European Commission, (2006), Monitoring Report of the European Commission on 26 September 2006,     
creating the framework for establishing, after Romania accession into the European Union, a mechanism 
for cooperation and controlling the developments recorded in the area of the reform of judiciary and fight 
against corruption. 
European Commission, (2007), Report concerning the evolution of the accompaning measures in Romania 
after accession, 27 June 2007 
18 Commission Decision no. 2006/928/EC on 13 December 2006, published in Official Journal of the 
European Union no. 354 on 14 December 2006.  
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Table I.2.  Priority areas and objectives of the National Strategy on preventing and combating 
corruption in vulnerable sectors and local government (2008-2010) 
 
Priority area Objectives  
 
Priority area I 
 
ANALYSES, STUDIES, RESEARCHES ON 
THE CORRUPTION PHENOMENON  
Objective: Supporting public administration in 
view to evaluate the size of the corruption 
phenomenon  
Objective 1: Increasing the information degree 
and awareness on the risks associated to 
corruption   
Objective 2: Increasing the transparency in the  
public services  
Objective 3: Developing the human resource 
management system in view to diminish the 
risks associated to the corruption phenomenon   
 
Priority area II 
 
COOPERATION, TRANSPARENCY, 
INTEGRITY, SIMPLIFICATION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
 
Objective 4: Simplifying the administrative 
procedures in view to improve the public 
services  
 
  
Order no. 1136/2005, on the Programme for development of the management control 
system of the Ministry of Public Health and creation of the working group for 
monitoring, coordinating and methodological guidance concerning the management 
control systems in the Ministry of Public Health, transposing the Order no. 946/2005 
(Code on the internal control) of the Ministry of Public Finance (MFP);  
Order of the National Chamber of Health Insurance no. 328/2006, on monitoring and 
control in the health social insurance systems;  
Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 880/2006, on the Regulation for organisation 
and functioning of the Public Health Authority (inquiries and complaints);  
Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 922 on 27 July 2006, on approving the model 
for the management contract of the public hospital;  
Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 921 / 2006, on the attributions of the steering 
committee of the hospitals;  
Order no. 1781/558 on 27 December 2006 (for approving the Methodological rules to 
apply Framework Contract concerning the conditions for providing medical assistance in 
the health social insurance systems  for 2007);  
Order of the Minister of Public Health no. 320/2007 on the Contract of administrating the  
department/laboratory or medical service in the public hospital. 
  
The Governing Programme of Romania 2009-201219 in Chapter 22: Reform of public 
administration and Chapter 23: Justice and anticorruption policies, states the fight against 
corruption, simplification of administrative procedures, increasing the transparency of 
public services as governance objectives. 
 
                                                 
19 Source: http://www.gov.ro  
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Chapter II Corruption in Romania. Empirical researches 
 
II. 1 Social perception on corruption in public administration 
 
For the time being, public administration (PA) in Romania is subject to an intense reform 
process, defined as “ensemble of measures for reform at the level of civil service, local 
government, through continuing the decentralization process, improving the public 
policy-making”. 20 In the vision of the above strategy, the decentralization process 
becomes an important lever in the fight against corruption. 
However, we should take in consideration that “deficient implementation of the 
decentralization process could generate an increase of corruption at local level, with 
negative consequences on economic and social level, both on short and long term”21. 
Based on several outstanding empirical researches aimed at assessing how the reform 
process in public administration contributes to reducing corruption, Andrei, Matei and 
Rosca (2008) determine factors generating corruption, grouping them on the following 
categories:  
i) political factors, including maturity of the democratic system, quality of the judicial 
and electoral system, level of administrative decentralization, tradition of the public 
administration system etc.; ii) economic factors, such as openness level of the economy, 
size of the public sector, economic competitiveness, volume of foreign investments in 
economy etc.; iii) social and cultural factors, as well as iv) historical factors.  
 
II.1.1 Organisation of the empirical research 
 
In May 2008, in order to determine the characteristics of the reform process in public 
administration, a research based on statistic survey was organised at the level of public 
administration. Within the research, a representative sample was defined at the level of 
civil servants from public administration. In order to create the sample, a technique for 
sampling in 2 phases was turned into account, comprising 971 civil servants from the 
central and local government. The error of estimating the parameters represents 1.2% and 
the probability of guaranteeing the results represents 97%. 
A statistic questionnaire was applied, comprising questions grouped on the following 
major topics: internal organisation of the institutions in public administration, pressure of 
the political system on the institutions from central and local government, the 
decentralization process in administration, civil service, gender discrimination in 
institutions from this sector of activity, corruption and its implications on the economic-
social development at national and local level. The questionnaire also comprised a series 
of questions concerning personal issues, such as gender of the person, age, education 
level, category of the institution where he/she works etc. The sample included employees 
from central government, county councils, prefectures and decentralised public services. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Government of Romania, (2004), Strategy for the public administration reform”,  http://www.gov.ro
21 Andrei, T., Matei, A., Rosca, I., (2008), Coruptia. O analiza economica si sociala, Editura Economica, 
Bucharest, p. 24. 
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II.1.2 Empirical results 
 
The economic literature pays special attention to the studies on evaluating corruption and 
its impact on the economy, in general and on sectors of activity, in particular. In this 
respect, we mention a series of papers estimating the impact of corruption on the 
economic growth (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995) on the military expenditure 
(Gupta, Mello and Sharan, 2001), on the public health and education system (Gupta, 
Davoodi and Tiongson, 2000), on direct foreign investments (Wei, 1997), on life quality 
and poverty. 
In order to analyse the corruption phenomenon, the questionnaire comprised a series of 
questions for evaluating the PA employees’ opinion about the level of corruption, factors 
generating corruption and the economic and social consequences of this phenomenon. 
 
II.1.2.1 Level of corruption on sectors of activity 
 
In order to evaluate the civil servants’ opinion concerning the level of corruption, we 
consider the variable C1, measured on a scale with values ranking from 1 – corresponding 
to the cases when corruption is at a low level and 5 – corresponding to the situation when 
corruption is at a generalised level. In view to define this variable, we took into 
consideration the PA employees’ opinion concerning the level of corruption in education, 
health, politics, local government, central government and corruption in their own 
institution. 
The average level of this characteristic, evaluated on the basis of the data provided by the 
sample represents 3.20, and the standard deviation equals 0.80. If we transform the above 
value according to Transparency International index (TCI), we obtain 3.6, revealing 
relative similar results for the two measurements. Generally, the values of this corruption 
index for Romania are between 3.0 and 3.4, situating Romania among the countries with 
the highest corruption level at European level. The following relation was applied in 
order to pass from the measurement scale used in this study to TCI scale: 
 
                         6.3
5
10)2.35( =−  
 
Table II.1 presents concrete results. 
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Table II.1 Level of corruption on sectors of activity 
 
 
 Education Health Politics Local 
government 
Central 
government 
In your 
institution 
No corruption 5.8 4.2 3.9 7.4 6.6 30.8
Corruption on 
an insignificant 
extent 
22.0 11.5 8.2 20.6 16.0 35.8
Corruption at 
moderate level 
41.6 30.7 16.3 37.0 31.1 22.5
Corruption on a 
large extent 
24.4 38.1 41.0 26.4 33.7 7.2
Generalised 
corruption 
6.3 15.6 30.6 8.6 12.6 3.8
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average 3.03 3.49 3.86 3.08 3.29 2.17
Median 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Standard 
deviation 
0.972 1.021 1.064 1.050 1.085 1.064
Pearson coefficient 
1 0.634(*) 0.500 (*) 0.594 (*) 0.504 (*) 0.474 (*)
1 0.601 (*) 0.494 (*) 0.451 (*) 0.350 (*)
1 0.543 (*) 0.622 (*) 0.280 (*)
1 0.745 (*) 0.571 (*)
1 0.452 (*)
 
 
 1
* Correlation is significant for 1% 
 
 
II.1.2.2 Elements favouring corruption 
 
In view to analyse the causes of corruption in public administration, the following 
elements were taken into consideration: legal framework, payment system, morality of 
the civil servants, pressure on behalf of the economic environment, pressure of the 
political system and citizens’ behaviour. The influence of each element was measured on 
a scale from 1 (the element has influence on a large extent) to 5 (the element is not at all 
influencing corruption). (Table II.2) 
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Table II.2 Elements favouring corruption in public administration 
 
 Legal 
framework 
Payment 
system 
Civil 
servants’ 
morality 
Pressure on 
behalf of the 
economic 
environment 
Pressure of 
the 
political 
system 
Citizens’ 
behaviour 
To a large 
extent 
17.4 37.7 21.6 13.5 27.0 11.5
Quite large 27.1 35.9 29.7 34.4 27.7 24.4
Moderate 28.8 15.9 30.9 30.1 26.5 34.8
Insignificant 
extent 
16.8 6.3 12.7 15.3 11.2 18.7
Not at all 9.9 4.2 5.0 6.6 7.6 10.7
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average 2.74 2.03 2.49 2.67 2.44 2.92
Median 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00
Standard 
deviation 
1.21 1.08 1.11 1.09 1.21 1.14
 
 
II. 1.2.3 The effect of corruption on the economic and social environment 
 
In order to evaluate PA employees’ opinion concerning the negative effect of corruption 
on the economic and social environment, the questionnaire comprised a series of 
questions, defining the primary variables for quantifying the negative effect of corruption 
on the local development, national development, quality of education, public health 
system, quality of the political environment, quality and image of local and central 
government.  C2 represents the variable measuring the negative effects of corruption on 
the economic and social environment. It is evaluated on a scale ranking from -2, 
corresponding to a pronounced negative effect of corruption to 2, case when the 
respondents consider that the corruption phenomenon has positive effects on the 
economic and social environment. 
The average level of the aggregated variable equals -1.06, revealing a negative effect of 
corruption on the economic and social environment in Romania. The standard deviation 
of this variable equals 0.91. (Table II.3) 
 
Table II.3 How the results in various fields influence the level of corruption 
 Development 
of your town 
National 
development 
Education Health Political 
field 
Local 
government 
Central 
government
Negative 33.7 38.5 36.8 44.0 52.2 37.0 41.7
Moderate 
negative 
40.5 43.0 39.0 36 30.1 42.1 38.3
No 
influence 
15.4 7.3 14.1 9.6 6.4 11.1 9.4
Moderate 
positive 
9.3 9.1 7.0 7.4 6.7 7.6 7.6
Positive 1.1 2.2 3.0 2.8 4.6 2.2 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Average -0.96 -1.06 -0.99 -1.11 -1.19 -1.04 -1.08
Standard 
deviation 
0.981 1.009 1.031 1.035 1.110 0.993 1.040
 
    
II.1.2.4 Contribution of some factors to reducing corruption 
 
In order to reduce the level of corruption in a country, various strategies are developed in 
view to create new institutional structures and improve the legal framework for 
combating corruption, enhancing the efficiency of the state structures through creation of 
efficient institutions at central and local level, modernisation of the civil service, 
reforming the political environment, setting up and developing nongovernmental 
institutions, aiming to support the fight against corruption. 
Media plays an important role in countering corruption, supporting the increase of 
transparency for the decisions at political level. The cultural factors and mentalities of the 
population in a country or certain geographical region contribute directly to maintaining 
the level of corruption.  In view to evaluate the influence of some factors to reducing 
corruption, variables were defined on the basis of the questions inside the questionnaire. 
These variables quantify the civil servants’ opinion concerning the influence of media, 
school, church, political environment, representatives of state/civil servants in central and 
local government. In order to measure the above primary variables, a scale ranking from  
-2 (corresponding to the case when the effect of the factor encourages the corruption 
phenomenon) to 2 (value assigned when the factor contributes to reducing corruption). C3 
represents the aggregated variable measuring the efficiency of the factors for reducing 
corruption. 
The average level of this characteristic equals 0.22, the standard deviation is 0.82. The 
average value of this characteristic reveals insignificant influence of the factors for the 
fight against corruption at the Romanian society level. Average values and average 
square deviations were calculated for the eight factors. (see Table II.4). 
 
Table II.4 Characteristics of the factors which contribute to reducing corruption 
 Media School Church Behaviour 
of  
politicians 
at central 
level 
Behaviour 
of  
politicians 
at local 
level 
Behaviour of the 
state 
representatives/civil 
servants in central 
government 
Behaviour 
of the 
civil 
servants 
at local 
level 
Citizens’ 
behaviour 
Negative 
(-2) 
5.2 1.8 1.8 28.9 19.4 11.8 7.1 6.9
Moderate 
negative 
(-1) 
7.4 5.5 4.9 26.0 32.7 30.7 30.0 27.2
No 
influence 
(0) 
10.0 33.6 35.0 15.1 16.0 17.1 19.2 22.5
Moderate 
positive 
(1) 
48.5 41.9 34.5 20.3 22.4 29.6 31.0 28.7
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Positive 
(2) 
28.8 17.3 23.8 9.7 9.5 10.8 12.6 13.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average 0.87 0.67 0.73 -0.44 -0.30 -0.03 0.11 0.15
Standard 
deviation 
1.138 0.884 0.936 1.347 1.272 1.229 1.178 1.169
 
 
II.2 Social perception on corruption in the public health system 
 
The national authorities and the international organisations are concerned to evaluate 
social perception on corruption in the public health systems. Without insisting on the 
extension and results of the above studies, we remark some important assertions in this 
field. 
Thus, Transparency International (2006)22 reviews the main causes of corruption in the 
health care systems. The conclusions reveal both “the propensity to corruption in health 
systems”23, providing examples about the specific modalities for this field concerning the 
“agent principal” theory and “state capture”. 
Emphasising five main actors in the health systems, the core causes of corruption are: 
uncertainty, asymmetry of information and high number of actors.24
  
                                                 
22 Transparency International (2006), “The Causes of Corruption in the Health Sector: a focus on health 
care systems”, www.transparency.org/.../20corruption.pdf 
23 Savedoff, D., W, Hussmann, K., (2005), “Why are health systems prone to corruption”, included in 
Transparency International (2006), p.6 
24  Transparency International (2006), op.cit., p.5 
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Figure II. 1 Five key actors in the health system25
 
The modalities of corruption aim mainly issues of regulation, social security 
organisations, health insurance organisations, providers of health care, patients, 
equipment suppliers. 
The study emphasises, concretely, for each actor, the possibilities of fraud or corruption. 
Corruption in health systems has an endemic character, being expressed in relation to the 
national and universal specificity, as many causes and modalities are similar in several 
states. 
 
It is worth to mention other papers, relevant for the topic approached by us, namely, 
Arrow (1963), Lewis (2006), Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Andrei (2009). At the same time, 
Andrei, Matei and Oancea (2009) achieve a statistical processing and analysis on the 
relations between corruption and performance in the health public system in Romania. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Undertaken after Savedoff and Husmann (2005), p. 7 
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II.2.1 Generalities 
 
We present several aspects concerning the measurement of the opinion of medical staff 
with higher education studies on issues about the level of corruption, role of factors and 
institutions in favouring corruption inside the public health system. There are also 
important aspects concerning the methodology and the results further the application of 
descriptive methods. A series of channels for propagating corruption inside the system 
are identified. It is worth to mention the following: 
- the system of changing the managing staff from the medical institutions on 
political criteria; 
- the existence and application of a defective legal framework, encouraging the 
occurrence of corruption  acts in the public health system; 
- deficiencies of the payment system for medical staff, which is not motivating 
the medical staff in achieving a quality medical act; 
- pressure of the economic and business environment on the administrators of 
the medical units; 
- patients’ behaviour, encouraging the non-academic behaviour for the medical 
staff. 
 
II.2.2 Empirical results 
 
II.2.2.1 Evaluating the corruption level 
 
In view to evaluate the doctors’ perception concerning the level of corruption, a 
measurement scale with five values was used. Value 1 – there is no corruption for this 
field. Value 2 – there is corruption on insignificant extent. Value 3 – there is corruption at 
moderate level. Value 4 – there is corruption on a large extent. Value 5 – there is 
generalised corruption in this field. 
The questionnaire comprised five questions for measuring the opinion concerning the 
level of corruption on fields of activity. (Table II.5.a)  
The fields are education, health, politics, public administration, the institution of 
employment of the respondent. 
For a global evaluation of the level of corruption, an aggregated variable of level one is 
defined, taking into consideration the level of corruption in education, health, 
administration and institution of the doctor completing the questionnaire. In order to 
evaluate the level of corruption, the data concerning the politics are not taken in 
consideration, as the inadequate behaviour of the politicians generate corruption at the 
level of the other fields. 
The opinion of the medical staff with higher education studies, on levels of corruption is 
presented in Table 5. Only valid questionnaires (with answers on all five items) have 
been taken into consideration. Their total number was, in this regard, 375. 
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Table II.5.a. Level of corruption on areas 
Education Health Politics Public administration Institution of employment for the 
doctor 
3.16 
(0.975) 
3.28 
(0.992) 
4.29 
(0.840) 
4.02 
(0.866) 
2.47 
(1.081) 
Note: below every average there is the square average. 
 
For ensuring the compatibility of the data collected within the framework of this analysis, 
with those employed by the Corruption Perception Index as calculated by Transparency 
International, we have used the following transformation: 
 
Corruption Index (TI) = 2 (5 – Corruption index)  [1] 
 
In TI case, a low value may underline a high level of corruption within the system. The 
domain of values for the indicator is 1 to 10. Interpreting the results must take into 
consideration that in 2007, corruption in Romania as estimated by Transparency 
International is 3.7. This puts Romania on the 30th place in Europe. The trust interval 
estimated for that is (3.4   4.1). In a world ranking, Romania is situated on 69th place.  
Applying the transformation made above, we obtain the following results in the table 
provided below: 
 
Table II.5.b Level of corruption on areas (compatible to TI) 
 
Education Health Politics Public administration Institution of employment for the 
doctor 
3.78 3.44 1.42 1.96 5.06 
 
The corruption index, calculated at the level of the sample, based on the results provided 
by five institutions, presents the following characteristics: 
 
• The value of corruption index  is equal to 3.23, and the standard deviation is 
0.759. Calculating the average on the collected questionnaires (375 in number), 
with valid answers to all items representative for defining primary variables. 
• Corruption Index evaluated on the basis of the transformation [1] is equal to 3.52, 
a value to be found in the trust interval of the Corruption Perception Index as 
calculated by Transparency International. 
• The distribution of corruption, as defined on the basis of data series is 
symmetrical. 
• Relatively similar profiles are recorded in the case of data series for education and 
health, respectively administration and politics. Actually, for education and health 
and administration and politics there are almost equal values present. 
 
II 2.2.2. Factors for reducing / favouring corruption 
 
  In order to estimate the influence of factors for maintaining corruption inside the 
system, the questionnaire comprised five questions. The study took into consideration 
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five factors: legal framework, payment system, pressure on behalf of the economic 
environment, pressure of the political system, patients’ behaviour. 
It is important to identify the factors maintaining corruption inside the public health 
system and to measure its influence. 
In order to measure the doctors’ opinion concerning the influence of the five factors in 
propagating corruption in the public health system, a scale with five values is used: 1 – 
the factor has a large influence in propagating corruption inside the system; 2- the factor 
has quite a large influence; 3- the influence is moderate; 4 – the factor influences to  
insignificant extent the level of corruption in the public health system; 5 – the factor has 
no influence on the level of corruption at the system level. 
 
 
Table II.6 Distribution of responses concerning the contribution of factors to favouring 
corruption (%) 
 
 Non-
response 
To a large 
extent
Quite large Moderate To 
insignificant 
extent 
Not at all
1. Legal 
framework 
5.7 22.9 18.2 25.3 20.4 7.5
2. Payment 
system 
2.9 64.9 21.6 6.6 2.2 1.7
3. Pressure on 
behalf of the 
economic 
environment 
5.4 33.7 29.2 19.9 9.3 2.5
4. Pressure of 
the political 
system 
6.4 24.6 22.1 20.6 19.4 6.9
5. Patients’ 
behaviour 
4.9 16.7 19.4 26.8 20.9 11.3
 
Also, Table II.7 presents the distribution of responses concerning the contribution of 
other institutions to reducing corruption. 
 
Table II.7 Distribution of responses concerning the contribution of other institutions to 
reducing corruption (%) 
 
 Non 
response 
Negative Moderate 
negative
No 
influence
Moderate 
positive 
Positive
1. Media 3.2 12.3 9.8 17.9 44.5 12.3
2. School  3.4 5.4 5.7 38.3 35.4 11.8
3. Church 3.9 4.2 3.7 50.1 26.3 11.8
4. Politics  3.2 42.8 25.6 10.6 9.8 8.1
5. State 
representatives/ 
civil servants 
3.2 34.6 29.0 12.8 11.8 8.6
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Chapter III. Towards a model of cost-benefit analysis  for the anticorruption 
strategies 
 
III.1  Documentary fundamental issues 
 
Several papers approached the application of the economic mechanisms in evaluating the 
costs and benefits of corruption and combating corruption; even if they did not refer 
explicitly to the cost-benefit analysis, they revealed how fundamental notions and 
concepts could adapt to this topic. In this respect, we mention Arrow (1963), Savedoff 
(2004), Getzen (1997), Mueller (1997), Persson and Tabellini (2002), Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) etc. 
Fundamental notions and concepts concerning the uncertainty of decisions, informational 
asymmetry, moral hazard or public choice gain in the above papers the appropriate 
significance in evaluating the measures and anticorruption strategies. If we add “agent 
principal” theory or “state capture”, we shape a fully framework for analysing the 
anticorruption strategies. Rose-Ackerman (2005) concludes: “the empirical research in 
various states confirms the negative influence of corruption on the economic growth and 
productivity, but is not helpful in shaping the anticorruption strategies. She states that 
corruption is harmful but she does not identify the mechanisms for influencing the 
economic performance26. The World Bank27 also identifies the main costs of corruption, 
namely poverty and inequality with consequences on fiscal stability, economic growth, 
investment growth, development assistance or environment. The direct effects consist in 
“administrative corruption” and the indirect effects on “state capture”. In fact, Rose-
Ackerman (2005), in the introductory part, approaches the costs of corruption and in 
Chapter 2, she isolates the most important situations where widespread corruption can 
determine who obtains the benefits and bears the costs of government action. 
 
? The government may be charged with allocating scarce benefit to individuals and 
firms using legal criteria other than willingness to pay. Bribes clear the market. 
? Officials in the public sector may have little incentive to do their jobs well, given 
official pay scales and the level of internal monitoring. They may impose delays 
and other roadblocks. Bribes act as incentive bonuses. 
? Those engaged in legal pursuits seek to reduce the costs imposed on them by 
government in the form of taxes, customs duties, regulations. Bribes lower costs. 
? Illegal businesses frequently purchase corrupt benefits from the state. In extreme 
cases illegal businesses and organized crime bosses dominate the police and other 
parts of the state through corruption and intimidation. Bribes permit criminal 
activity.  
 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. A bribe that acts as an incentive 
payment, for example, might also allocate a scarce benefit or provide a tax 
exemption. Nevertheless, each raises enough distinctive issues so that it is worth 
considering each one separately28. 
                                                 
26 Rose-Ackerman (2005), op.cit. p.3 
27 World Bank, (2008), Costs, Consequences of Corruption, www.worldbank.org 
28 Rose-Ackerman, S.,  (2005), op.cit. pp. 9-10 
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III.2  Effects and mechanisms 
Structuring the economic effects on several categories, Prohnitchi (2003) identifies the 
economic mechanisms that are used. 
 
Table III. 1 Economic implications of corruption29
 
Category Effect Mechanism 
Aggravating the gap 
between effective and 
potential economic growth  
Reducing the currents assets, corruption pushes 
down the curve of production and influences 
labour market 
Reducing the direct internal 
investments and the foreign 
investments 
The increase of the risk bonus leads to 
eliminating investment projects with low return 
on investment, which would be acceptable in 
normal conditions.  
Increasing the risk of 
financial crisis or even 
financial chaos 
The banks could be obliged by corrupt civil 
servants and officials to award non-qualitative 
preferential credits. 
Macroeconomic 
effects 
Higher risk of inflation The mechanism of influence is not clear but the 
connection is powerful and significant. 
Aggravating the budgetary 
deficit 
Reducing the possibilities to accumulate fiscal 
revenues by bribing the tax inspectors or custom 
officers. 
High weight of unofficial 
economy 
High bribes, associated to the necessity to avoid 
coercitive or prohibitive regulations determine 
the enterprises to transfer resources in the 
unofficial sector of economy. 
Reducing the social 
expenses 
The fiscal multiplier decreases. 
Negative effects on public 
investments, like: 
 
Launching great investment 
projects, but inefficient and 
insufficient social expenses 
Corrupt civil servants promote large, complex 
projects, providing higher opportunities for 
further withdrawal the funds 
Insufficient allocation for 
operation and maintenance 
Operation and maintenance do not provide so 
many possibilities for fraud of funds. 
(embezzlement) 
The effect of the above two consists in reducing the quality of current 
infrastructure 
Structural effects 
Exaggerated allocation for 
purchasing new equipment, 
technically sophisticated, 
above the country needs. 
Further the agreement between the corrupt civil 
servant notifying the import and the importing 
enterprise, a margin from the exaggerated price 
is further transferred back to civil servant. 
(kickback)  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Undertaken after Prohitchi, V., (2003), op.cit. pp. 37-38 
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Category Effect Mechanism 
Increasing the relative cost 
of capital. 
Increasing the transaction 
costs. 
To the bank’s interest rate, the rate of the bribes 
paid should be added in the total of the lent 
capital. 
The corrupt transaction involve high transaction 
costs under the form of bribes, moral costs, 
monetary value of the risks, lost time etc. 
Increasing the costs to enter 
the market 
The enterprises already in the market afford to 
pay higher bribes that the enterprises intending to 
enter the market. 
Inefficient allocation of the  
public procurement 
contracts 
Contracts are signed with the firms paying the 
highest bribe, not compulsory with those which 
are the most economically efficient. 
Inefficient allocation of the 
property rights 
Privatisation in the transition countries was 
accompanied not only by owners who got rich, 
but also by civil servants who distributed the 
patrimony in a corrupt manner. 
Economic 
efficiency of the 
production 
factors 
Distortions of competition The competitor with personal connections has 
competitive advantage and not the efficient 
competitor. 
Favouring the inequality of 
revenues 
The corrupt networks are resistant to starting up 
new businesses. Along with directly reducing the 
rates of economic growth, it reduces the 
economic opportunities for large social 
categories. 
Favouring the tax inequality The honest firms pay legal taxes and they are 
disadvantaged against those paying smaller 
bribes than the legal taxes. 
Redistribution of wealth For corruption with theft, the public patrimony is 
tenebrous evaded and misappropriated by corrupt 
civil servants.  
Decreasing the consumer’s 
utility 
Example: how do customers feel in the maxi taxi 
running under the indifferent watch of the traffic 
agents on the municipal routes, without proper 
equipment, exceeding the speed, breaking the 
traffic rules.  
Inequalities and 
efficiency 
Insufficient delivery of 
public services and goods 
(fresh air, pure drinking 
water) 
Example: some firms in industry and agriculture, 
the owners of the transport means pay bribes for 
the right to break the ecological regulations 
concerning waste, smog etc. 
 
III. 3 Conclusions 
 
Cost-benefit analysis should begin with identification of the costs and the anticorruption 
strategies will propose to diminish them. In the syntagm “cost-benefit analysis”, the 
“benefits” will occur after implementing the anticorruption strategies. 
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